Against California High Speed Rail

Against California High Speed Rail by Mark R. Powell

California Rail Authority and Senators Question the Legality of the Revised 2012 Business Plan

State Senators ask Legislative Counsel and Rail Authority asks Attorney General to Comment on Legality of the Business Plan.
Senator Joseph Simitian, Chairman of Budget Subcommittee, and Senator Mark DeSaulnier, Chair of the Policy Committee on Transportation wrote to the Legislative Counsel, Ms. Diane Boyer-Vine on April 18 in search of an opinion on the legality of the Authority’s Revised 2012 Business Plan.  The entire body of their letter reads as follows:

On April 12, 2012 the California High Speed Rail Authority adopted a “business plan” for the statewide high speed rail project.  We are writing to ask your office to review the adopted plan and advise us as to whether or not the plan is legally compliant with the provisions of Proposition 1A, as approved by the voters in Continue reading

Rail Authority Puts Lipstick On Their High-Speed Pig

Makeover depicted in new Revised Draft 2012 Business Plan
The California High-Speed Rail Authority’s Draft 2012 Business Plan released in November of 2011 (November Plan) was widely criticized for starting construction in the Central Valley, high costs, lack of a credible funding plan, and its completion date of 2033.  But a careful read of the Revised Draft 2012 Business Plan (April Plan) released the Monday following April Fool’s Day reveals the same foul Continue reading

Rail Authority admits in Senate Hearing it lacks a clear Funding Plan

And yet they still propose spending $6 billion on a Central Valley Railroad

Dan Richard, Chairman of the California High-Speed Rail Authority, told Senators and the public at a Senate Hearing held March 13 that with respect to the about-to-be-released Revised 2012 Business Plan:

“I don’t believe we are going to be able to look you in the eye or look the public in the eye and tell them that we have any greater clarity about the funding today than we did on November 1st when we issued our draft plan.” [Note 1]

The risk of a $6 billion “stranded investment” in the Central Valley
The Authority was created sixteen years ago and tasked with preparing a high-speed intercity rail plan and to “designate an entity with stable and predictable Continue reading

High-Speed Rail Evolution

A History of Deceit and Broken Promises
With a lull in news about California’s high-speed rail project as both proponents and opponents await the release of the Final 2012 Business Plan it is worth looking back over the past two decades at the promises and the reality of this project.

The California High-Speed Rail Authority was created in 1996 so that California might “have a comprehensive network of high-speed intercity rail systems by the year 2020.  To achieve this goal it was to immediately “begin preparation of a high-speed intercity rail plan similar to California’s former freeway plan and designate an entity with stable and predictable funding sources to implement the plan.” [Note 1]

Early Promises (2000 Business Plan)
Now mostly forgotten, and with only remnants of the plan still available on the Authority’s website, this plan’s highlights promised:
• 6 years of environmental and preliminary design work followed by a 10 year construction schedule for the statewide system that would connect all major metropolitan areas [Note 2].
• a $25 billion cost (expressed in 1999 dollars) [Note 3].
• a proposal to fund the project with a temporary sales Continue reading

Hints of a New Path for California High Speed Rail

Senator Feinstein and Bay Area Representatives Call for Initial Construction in Bay Area.
Two high profile letters to the proponents of high-speed rail hint at a major shift in construction plans.  The most recent, a letter from Senator Diane Feinstein to Governor Brown [note 1], culled seven action items from the recent High-Speed Rail Peer Group Report and urged these “be addressed quickly with a concerted effort under your leadership”.

1. select an initial operating segment as soon as possible,
2. include a deployment plan for electrified high speed trains with positive train control systems,
3. further develop the business plan to address risk and cost issues,
4. involve the private sector in project design,
5. increase project management capacity,
6. subject demand forecasts to greater scrutiny, and
7. “reduce the risk to the state of a stranded project” by investing initial funding in the segments that currently serve significant train ridership (San Jose to San Francisco Continue reading

California’s High-Speed Rail Peer Review Group…

…Knowledgeable, accomplished, well-educated and definitely NOT “peers” of the Rail Authority
The Peer Review Group is composed of successful engineers, scientists, and economists with expertise in transportation and large infrastructure projects.  The group notably contains no lawyers or persons who have ever held elective office.  Their backgrounds are in stark contrast with their supposed “peers” on the California High-Speed Rail Authority (the Authority) who’s membership includes four lawyers (three who have served in elective office) and two union organizers in addition Continue reading

California High-Speed Rail’s Fraudulent Funding Plan

Rail Authority Relies on Non-Existent Federal Programs and All $9 Billion of Proposition 1A Bonds to Build the Initial Operating Section.

The voter approved High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act, Proposition 1A, stipulates that a funding plan must be in place for a usable high-speed rail corridor before any Rail Bonds can be released for construction of that corridor [Note 1]. 

The California High-Speed Rail Authority’s Draft 2012 Business Plan purports to show funding plans for usable Continue reading

Californians Turn 2 to 1 Against High Speed Rail

Only Californians Aligned with the “Occupy Movement” Remain Strongly Supportive.
A Field Poll [Note 1] conducted by telephone between November 15-27, 2011 involving 1000 randomly selected registered California voters posed the following question:

“Suppose that 9 billion dollars in state bonds for the California High Speed Rail project were put before voters again in a statewide election ballot. If the election were being held today, would you vote Yes to approve or No to reject this bond package?”

In a stunning rebuke of the California High-Speed Rail Project and Continue reading

High-Speed Rail Ridership Forecasts are Preposterous!

The California High-Speed Rail Authority’s newest Business Plan forecasts that when Phase 1 is completed in 2033, 8.7 million high-speed train (HST) trips will be made annually between San Francisco and Los Angeles/Anaheim [Note 1] [Note 2].   These 8.7 million HST riders must essentially come from two sources; airline passengers or automobile passengers.  Listed below are three reasons why airline and automobile passengers will not switch to the HST in anywhere near the numbers claimed by the Rail Authority.

Reason #1    Travel Times by HST are Closer to Driving than to Flying.
Traveling by high-speed train between the Bay Area and the LA Basin will take  2 ½  hours longer than flying.  While the Authority speaks of traveling from San Francisco to Los Angeles in 2 hours and 40 minutes on an Express Train, Express Trains will be the exception and not the rule.  According to the Peak and Non-Peak Train Schedules [Note 3] included in the 2012 Draft Business Plan only 22% of trains will be Express Trains  and the average time for all trains traveling between San Francisco and Los Angeles Continue reading

New Plan Says Phase 1 of California High Speed Rail Could Cost $117.6 Billion…..Plus Finance Charges of another $94 Billion

Rail Authority suggests simply charging it all to the American Debt card
California’s High-Speed Rail Authority (the Authority) rolled out their 2011 Business Plan first to the press and then later put the entire plan on-line.  The Authority’s practice of dribbling out selective information to the press resulted in banner headlines across the state that read, “High-Speed Rail Could Cost $98.5 Billion”.  A thorough reading of the Authority’s plan reveals that $98.5  Billion is merely the low end of a range of cost estimates that go up to $117.6 Billion  depending on the route and the construction features. [Note 1]  And these costs totally ignore the interest over the next 22 years on the borrowed Continue reading